Background
Inner House case in which Northern Rock sought damages from the solicitor of one of its customers. Headway Caledonian Ltd borrowed sums from Northern Rock to finance the purchase of a Business Park in Hamilton. In return it granted a standard security in favour of Northern Rock. Some years later, Headway’s solicitor sent a draft discharge of the standard security to Northern Rock requesting that it sign and return the document. In the accompanying email, the solicitor stated that the company intended to sell the subjects and redeem the loan. However, that information was incorrect as Headway only intended to sell part of the subjects and to redeem part of the loan. (The reason for the error was unknown.)

Northern Rock (which had not instructed solicitors to act on its behalf in the transaction) relied on the email and granted the discharge of the standard security. The solicitor then registered it in the Land Register. As a result the loan became unsecured. Headway then became insolvent and the Northern Rock raised an action for damages against the solicitor and her firm in respect of its losses.

The solicitor argued that the lender was a third party to whom she did not owe a duty of care.

In the Outer House Lord Doherty agreed with that argument finding that, in the circumstances: (1) it was not reasonable for Northern Rock to rely on the solicitor’s statements without checking them by seeking clarification from the solicitor and/or looking at their file; and (2) that it was not reasonably foreseeable by the solicitor that Northern Rock would rely on the statements without such checks.

Decision
The Inner House allowed an appeal finding that, in the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that Northern Rock would rely on the solicitor’s statements and sign and return the discharges. Consequently the solicitor was to be taken to have assumed responsibility for her statements. The Inner House considered that Lord Doherty had not considered whether it was fair just and reasonable to impose a duty on the solicitor:

“As a consequence of the Lord Ordinary’s approach, he did not go on to consider whether the imposition of a duty of care would be fair, just and reasonable.  The context was, for the reasons I have explained, a background of assumption of responsibility and reasonable foresight of significant economic loss suffered by a bank in a sufficiently proximate relationship with a solicitor who had previously shown herself to be a trustworthy source.  The context was also, importantly, that that solicitor whilst acting outwith her mandate and instructions made a serious error and put in train a series of events which caused the bank to suffer significant loss.  What then of the fact that the loss could have been avoided if, having received the email which ought never to have been written and the attachments which ought never to have been sent, the bank had checked its file?  Does that mean that it would not be fair, just and reasonable to hold the solicitor liable?  I cannot identify any policy reason for doing so.  Nor can I conclude that that fact demonstrates that the solicitor should be relieved of liability.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

Outer House case considering a contract between the Bank of Ireland and Knight Frank relating to a valuation which Knight Frank provided to the Bank in respect of a client’s property over which the Bank received a standard security.

Background
The Bank claimed that it had suffered substantial loss as a result of the valuation and sought damages for negligence from Knight Frank. However, Knight Frank’s standard terms provided that any contract to provide a survey report was subject to English law and that the English courts would have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any dispute arising from it. The issue for the court was whether the standard terms formed part of the contract and, consequently, whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case.

Knight Frank had provided a valuation for the Bank’s client in relation to the property (near Kilmacolm) which was to be the subject of a development. The Bank instructed its own valuation of the property from Knight Frank (by letter dated 2 May). This was provided and included Knight Frank’s standard terms. However, in a departure from its normal practice, Knight Frank had not sought to ask the Bank in advance for written confirmation that the standard terms formed part of the contract. Following receipt of the valuation, the Bank advanced a loan of £2.35m to the client in return for a standard security.

Arguments
The parties were agreed that the Bank’s letter of instruction constituted an offer that the offer had been accepted by conduct. The Bank argued that the offer was accepted by Knight Frank when it delivered the valuation report to the bank. The contract was accepted at the moment the report went through the bank’s letterbox at which point it was too late to introduce new terms (the bank argued that it would have been odd if the fulfilment of the contract –i.e. providing the valuation- were to be treated as a counter offer.)

On the other hand, Knight Frank argued that the delivery of the valuation report along with the standard terms constituted a counter offer which the bank had accepted when it relied on the report to grant the loan.

Decision
Lord Woolman preferred Knight Frank’s argument noting that it had been open to the bank to raise an issue with Knight Frank regarding the standard terms and it had not one so. It was irrelevant that the officer of the bank dealing with the transaction had not read the standard terms. The Bank could not “cherry pick” the document: i.e. it could not accept the valuation without also accepting the standard terms attached. In coming to his conclusion, Lord Woolman also took account of the facts that it had not been surprising to the bank’s employees (giving evidence in the case) that surveyors would seek to introduce their own standard terms into the valuation agreement and that the terms introduced were not unusual.

As such, Lord Woolman found that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

Background
Outer House case in which Northern Rock sought damages from the solicitor of one of its customers. Headway Caledonian Ltd borrowed sums from Northern Rock to finance the purchase of a Business Park in Hamilton. In return it granted a standard security in favour of Northern Rock. Some years later, Headway’s solicitor sent a draft discharge of the standard security to Northern Rock requesting that it sign and return the document. In the accompanying email, the solicitor stated that the company intended to sell the subjects and redeem the loan. However, that information was incorrect as Headway only intended to sell part of the subjects and to redeem part of the loan. (The reason for the error was unknown.)

Northern Rock (which had not instructed solicitors to act on its behalf in the transaction) relied on the email and granted the discharge of the standard security. The solicitor then registered it in the Land Register. As a result the loan became unsecured. Headway then became insolvent and the Northern Rock raised an action for damages against the solicitor and her firm in respect of its losses.

The solicitor argued that the lender was a third party to whom she did not owe a duty of care.

Lord Doherty agreed with that argument.

Decision
Whilst a solicitor on one side of a conveyancing transaction will not normally owe a duty to the party on the other side, the law will imply a duty in exceptional circumstances.

The crucial considerations this case were (i) whether it was reasonable in the circumstances for Northern Rock to rely upon the misstatements without checking them by seeking clarification from the solicitor and/or looking at their file; and (ii) whether it ought to have been foreseeable by the solicitor that Northern Rock might reasonably rely upon the misstatements without checking them, and thereby suffer loss.

In favour of the view that there was the requisite foreseeability and reasonable reliance were that the email (i) contained no disclaimer; (ii) had a degree of urgency in its tone; (iii) was communicated directly to Northern Rock, rather than to professional advisers; and (iv) that it came from a solicitor (a trustworthy source).

On the other hand, being a commercial bank, Northern Rock were in no sense vulnerable or dependent. They had the ability to obtain legal advice if they required it. Ultimately though, the critical information had been factual and concerned matters that could have been checked very easily and very quickly by Northern Rock.

Lord Doherty also took into account the fact that the erroneous information in the email conflicted with what had previously been agreed between Headway Caledonian and Northern Rock and that in some respects the email had been vague and ambiguous and, as such, “cried out for further clarification”.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

(NB: see appeal to the Inner House here. See also the decision of Lord Woolman allowing the Proof here.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

This is an Outer House case in which Northern Rock sought damages from the solicitor of one of its customers. Headway Caledonian Ltd borrowed sums from Northern Rock to finance the purchase of a Business Park in Hamilton. In return it granted a standard security in favour of Northern Rock. Some years later, Headway’s solicitor sent a draft discharge of the standard security to Northern Rock requesting that it sign and return the document. In the accompanying email, the solicitor stated that the company intended to sell the subjects and redeem the loan. However, that information was incorrect as Headway only intended to sell part of the subjects and to redeem part of the loan. (The reason for the error was unknown.)

Northern Rock (which had not instructed solicitors to act on its behalf in the transaction) relied on the email and granted the discharge of the standard security. The solicitor then registered it in the Land Register. As a result the loan became unsecured. Headway then became insolvent and Northern Rock raised an action for damages against the solicitor and her firm in respect of its losses.

The solicitor argued that the lender was a third party to whom she did not owe a duty of care.

Lord Woolman considered the authorities on liability for economic loss including Midland Bank plc v Cameron, Thom, Peterkin & Duncans[1] in which Lord Jauncey identified four conditions that should normally be present for liability in such cases:

“…

1. the solicitor must assume responsibility for the advice or information furnished to the third party;
2. the solicitor must let it be known to the third party expressly or impliedly that he claims, by reason of his calling, to have the requisite skill or knowledge to give the advice or furnish the information;
3. the third party must have relied upon that advice or information as a matter for which the solicitor has assumed personal responsibility; and
4. the solicitor must have been aware that the third party was likely so to rely.”

Lord Woolman found that liability in delict[2] could not be decided without hearing the evidence and allowed a proof.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

Outer House case in which a property developer sought damages from his solicitors in respect of professional negligence.

The developer argued that, as a result of the solicitors’ negligence (in failing to advise him correctly), he entered a contract to sell land which was conditional on him obtaining planning permission (for residential development) within a period of 12 months and which made provision for the purchaser to withdraw from the contract if planning was not contained within the period but contained no corresponding provision allowing the developer to withdraw in the same situation. Consequently, when the developer failed to obtain planning permission, he was unable to withdraw from the contact and, as a result, and claimed that he was unable to accept an offer from an alternative purchaser at a higher price.

After considering the evidence of various witnesses, Lord Brodie found that the developer had failed to show that the solicitors were guilty of a failure to exercise reasonable care. Although the solicitors’ had given no direct advice to the developer himself, Lord Brodie held that the solicitors had given advice on the effect of the clause to the developer’s father who he found to be acting as an agent for the developer with actual authority to conclude the missives on his behalf. Lord Brodie accepted evidence to the effect that the developer’s father had repeatedly given instructions to the solicitors[1]

in the past (on behalf of, and with the knowledge of, the developer) and noted:

“It may be that there was no express agreement between father and son conferring the authority of the latter on the former. Indeed I would be surprised were that so. What is more probable is that they developed a way of working over a series of transactions, without ever formalising it. They were practical men operating in a very dynamic environment who were, reasonably enough, interested in making money in a booming market. Neither had much interest in “paper work”.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

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Outer House case in which Mr Phimister sued D.M. Hall for professional negligence in respect of a mortgage valuation report carried out on a property in Buckie in Aberdeenshire. The report was prepared in support of Mr Phimister’s application for a residential mortgage over the property. The report valued the property at £230k and noted that the garden ground and surrounding land was said[1] to extend to approximately 1.12 acres whereas in fact it only extended to about 0.66 acres[2].

Mr Phimister contended that DM Hall owed him a duty to check the area as part of their valuation and they were negligent in failing so to do. Whilst the area of the subjects may not have affected the valuation of the subjects for residential purposes (and Mr Phimister did not argue in court that it did), the smaller area severely restricted his opportunity to develop the site.

Lord Glennie found that Mr Phimister’s claim failed. To succeed Mr Phimister had to establish that the discrepancy between the actual acreage and that represented in the sales particulars should have been “obvious” to a surveyor carrying out his valuation with reasonable care. This would depend on the type of survey the surveyor was asked to carry out. Expert evidence agreed that the purpose of a mortgage valuation report was not to check the acreage of the site but to provide a valuation for mortgage purposes. Amortgage valuation report was not the appropriate tool to assess development potential; if the purchaser wanted such an assessment, he should instruct a development appraisal. A surveyor instructed to survey the subjects with a view to ascertaining whether there was room for building a certain number of houses on plots of a certain size would require, in the exercise of reasonable care, to assess the area of the subjects. However, Lord Glennie was not persuaded that a surveyor carrying out a residential mortgage valuation on a site with buildings standing on it would necessarily have been expected to notice that the site was considerably smaller than 1.12 acres. He would not, as Lord Glennie put it, “have been looking at the site through measuring eyes”.

In some cases the acreage of the site may be a relevant factor in assessing the value for mortgage purposes and, in such cases, the surveyor would have to take care to make an accurate measurement, or check a measurement given by another.However, in this case, the value lay in the buildings and not in the size of the plot and it was found that there was no reason to place such a burden on the surveyor.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case concerning the damages payable as a result of a solicitor’s professional negligence.  VMH LLP advised Kirkton in relation to the purchase of a site at 144 to 148 Slateford Road in Edinburgh in 2005 from HBJ 590. The site had the benefit of conditional planning permission for 19 terraced townhouses and 8 apartments.

Two of the conditions related to a requirement for the installation of a ventilation system to a fish and chip shop (the Codfather) situated adjacent to the site to ensure that odours from the shop exited at a suitable level.

In March 2005, the owner of the Codfather, Slateford Developments entered into an agreement with HBJ 590 allowing HBJ 590 to carry out the works to install the ventilation system.

Kirkton[1]  concluded missives for the sale of the site from HBJ 590 in April 2005 and in July 2005 Slateford Developments sold the Codfather to Ian McDonald Enterprises.

Kirkton began construction of the Development in autumn 2005. However, Ian McDonald disputed Kirkton’s entitlement to install the ventilation system and requested a payment of £75k in return for allowing the installation. Kirkton refused this offer on advice from VMH to the effect that they had a legal right to install the system.   However, it was subsequently found that Kirkton did not have a real right enforceable against the new owner of the Codfather.

In November 2007, having sought and failed to obtain a variation of the planning permission, Kirkton agreed to pay Ian McDonald £324k in return for the grant of a right to install the vent. In the meantime Kirkton had postponed active marketing and the launch of the development. Unfortunately for Kirkton the events also coincided with the onset of the property slump.

Kirkton argued that, as a result of VMH’s breach of duty, marketing and sales were delayed and VMH were liable for the consequences of the delay including the additional bank borrowing costs and lower sales prices as obtained a result of their increased exposure to the vagaries of the property market.

Having initially argued otherwise, VMH accepted that an enforceable right could have been constituted against the shop owner, it was their duty to advise Kirkton of that and take the required steps to constitute the right and that, by failing to do so, they were in breach of their duties to Kirkton. However, they contended that the losses claimed in respect of additional bank charges and diminution in sales proceeds were not within the scope of their duties. VMH  had not assumed the risk of such losses and it would not be fair and reasonable to impose it on them.

Lord Doherty disagreed:

“In my opinion the scope of the [VMH’s] duties to [Kirkton] was sufficiently wide to include the duty to avoid causing them each of the kinds of loss and damage they say were sustained…

They were not merely providing information to [Kirkton]. Their duties were more exacting. They were under a duty to take the necessary legal steps to protect the position of the [Kirkton] in relation to the ventilation issue at the time they concluded missives; and they were under a duty to advise them correctly of their legal position at the time of the proposal by [Ian McDonald] so that a properly informed decision could be made then as to what action to take…

Having regard to the nature and content of [VMH's] duties to [Kirkton], and to the whole circumstances in which they arose and were breached, it appears to me to be fair, just and reasonable that the scope of [VMH’s] duties should extend to the kinds of loss and damage  claimed… It was reasonably forseeable that [VMH’s] breach of duty might result in interruption to the planned progress of the development and sale of the properties, and might occasion delay and expense. [VMH] were aware that the development was being financed by bank borrowing. It was reasonably foreseeable that delay would result in additional borrowing costs. It was reasonably foreseeable that delay in achieving sales might result in longer exposure to the vagaries of the property market.”

After discussion as to causation and valuation of the loss, Lord Doherty awarded damages of more than £1.1m broken down as follows:

1. the settlement payment paid to Ian McDonald-                   £324,000
2. the other extrication costs-                                                  £55,812
3. diminution in sales proceeds-                                              £545,818
4. additional bank borrowing costs-                                         £209,742

The full text of the decision is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.