Background
Inner House case in which Mr Leonard sought damages from the Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority after falling and injuring himself while descending a path forming part of the West Highland Way at Balmaha. Mr Leonard (who had been 12 at the time of the accident) argued that the park authority had breached its duty under the Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 due to the presence of hazards and lack of preventative measures on the path.

Outer House decision
In the Outer House, Lord Uist found that the circumstances leading to the fall had not been proved but, even if they had been, there would have been no duty on the park authority under the 1960 Act. After considering the authorities (which suggest that, whilst an occupier will have a duty to fence off special or unfamiliar hazards, an occupier will not be liable for obvious dangers including natural features), Lord Uist found that the path under consideration in this case was “a long-standing artificial feature which was neither concealed nor unusual and did not involve exposure to any special or unfamiliar hazard. It had become a permanent, ordinary and familiar feature of the landscape”.

As a result, the park authority owed no duty to Mr Leonard (or anyone else) under the 1960 Act in respect of the path. Lord Uist also went further and found that, in addition to being inapplicable to long standing features, the occupier’s duty would not apply to other obvious artificial features (even though recently constructed) which have become part of the landscape and which do not involve exposure to special or unfamiliar hazards.

Appeal to the Inner House
On appeal, Mr Leonard argued that, in coming to his conclusion that the circumstances leading to the fall had not been proved, Lord Uist had overlooked or misstated some of the evidence.

Decision
The Inner House rejected that argument finding that Lord Uist had properly addressed himself as to what was relevant and material and had not omitted evidence.

Having come to that conclusion, the appeal had to be refused and it was not necessary for the court to consider the outcome in the event that Mr Leonard had been able to prove that he had tripped or lost his footing on the path. However, the court was nevertheless satisfied that Lord Uist had not been in error in that respect and noted:

“…the Lord Ordinary reviewed the authorities and correctly concluded that the law is to the effect that there is no duty on an occupier of land to warn or fence against obvious dangers.  In so far as a stone pitched path – as in the case of any rural path- inherently presents some risk of tripping or slipping, the Lord Ordinary was in our view well entitled to regard such as an obvious danger to which those using such a path required to be alert and to exercise appropriate care.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in which Mrs Shepherd sought damages from Travelodge following an injury sustained after slipping and falling following a diesel spill in Travelodge’s car park (situated near Dreghorn Services in Edinburgh).

Mr and Mrs Shepherd were motorcyclists and met other members of the Dunedin Chapter of the Harley Davidson Motor Cycle Club in the Travelodge car park (between 8.30 and 8.45) prior to riding to Staffordshire for an event. Before the bikers arrived there had been a diesel spill in the car park.

A manageress at Travelodge was informed of the spill sometime between 8.15 and 8.30. She logged a job with Travelodge’s maintenance company (in order to have the spill cleaned up) then phoned Travelodge’s health and safety manager and her divisional manager. On the advice of the health and safety manager, the manageress cordoned off the car park and put notices up saying that the car park was closed and advising that there had been spillage.

The bikers left the car park about 9am then stopped at Glencorse Barracks where Mrs Shepherd slipped and fell. The Court found, on the balance of probabilities, that the accident had been caused by diesel picked up by Mrs Shepherd on her boots at the Travelodge car park.

Mrs Shepherd argued that Travelodge were liable for the accident as they:

1. had breached their duty of care due in terms of s2 of the Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960;
2. had breached their common law duty of care; and
3. were vicariously liable for a breach of duty by the manageress.

Lord Boyd found that the accident had been foreseeable and the fact that it had happened some distance away from the original spill did not matter. In coming to this conclusion he noted that it was important that Mrs Shepherd had slipped as a result of diesel on the sole of her own boots and that it may have been different (i.e. not foreseeable) if she had slipped on diesel transferred to Glencorse on the soles of the boots of the other bikers.

 Lord Boyd also found that there was a duty of care both at common law and under the 1960 Act, noting that Travelodge were occupiers of the car park to which the public had access. That duty conferred an obligation on Travelodge to have a sign posted[1] at the entrance to the car park either closing the car park or at the very least warning people entering the car park of the danger.  The obligation would also extend to advising people who already had cars in the car park of the danger of slipping on the diesel. Travelodge had put up signs in this case, fulfilling the obligation and meeting the duty of care.

As to the actions of the manageress, Lord Boyd found that arguments to the effect that she should have acted more quickly were potentially problematic. From the evidence, the time frame between the Manageress finding out about the spillage and Mr and Mrs Shepherd arriving at the car park may be as little as a few minutes or, at the longest, half an hour. It was suggested that she may have sought the advice from the health and safety manager and carried out her instructions before contacting the maintenance company but Lord Boyd was not satisfied[2], on the balance of probabilities, that even if she had done so, the car park would have been closed before Mr and Mrs Shepherd arrived.

 As a result, Lord Boyd found in favour of Travelodge.

The full judgement is available from Scottish courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

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[1] Although the diesel was visible in the wet by means of the distinctive rainbow effect in the water, Lord Boyd did not consider that it would be so obvious to a motorist, motor cyclist or pedestrian that there was no need to put up any sign. As such, the circumstances of this case were very different to those in Leonard v Loch Lomond & Trossachs National Park Authority.

[2] It was noted that the suggestion was made with the benefit of hindsight and it was difficult to say that the manageress was in breach of her duty of care by arranging for the spill to be cleaned up as a priority.

Outer House case concerning a claim made under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 (and concurrent common law duties of care) and the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 (in particular regulations 5 and 17) following injuries caused as the result of a seagull attack.

Background
Ms Kelly worked at the Ladyburn Business Centre in Greenock which was owned and operated by Riverside (who accepted that they were also in the position of an employer). Whilst leaving the premises to buy her lunch she was attacked by a seagull which swooped at her with its wings outstretched causing her to stumble and fall on steps outside the centre.

Decision
After hearing the evidence, the court dismissed the claim finding that it had not been established on the balance of probabilities that the seagull which attacked Ms Kelly had come from the centre. Even if it could have been shown that the seagull had come from the centre, the temporary judge found that the claim  would nonetheless have failed.

Occupiers’ liability
With regard to occupiers’ liability (both at common law and under the 1960 Act) it was found that the incident was not reasonably foreseeable as Ms Kelly had been unable to show that complaints of analogous incidents had been made to Riverside prior to her accident.

Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992
With regard to the Workplace Regulations, regulation 5 was found to relate to maintenance rather than construction of the premises and Mr Kelly’s contention that the property should have been protected by measures such as spiking, meshing and netting were matters of construction. An argument that the seagull nests should have been regularly removed also failed as such acts were found to be control measures rather than maintenance.

Regulation 17(1) of the 1992 Regulations obliges an employer to organise the workplace “in such a way that pedestrians and vehicles can circulate in a safe manner”. However Ms Kelly’s case under that provision also failed, the temporary judge finding:

“The pursuer has failed to tie in the attacking bird to the roof of the LBC. That is of course a different and antecedent point in this case, but it is also an important one in the context of consideration of regulation 17. It is simply, in my view, not feasible to consider the behaviour of wild creatures such as herring gulls and lesser black-backed gulls in the context of a regulation such as regulation 17(1) which addresses the organisation of a workplace. This is especially so when knowledge of an actual problem has not successfully been imputed to persons such as the defenders in this case.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in which Mr Leonard sought damages from the Loch Lomond and the Trossachs National Park Authority after falling and injuring himself while descending a path forming part of the West Highland Way at Balmaha.

Arguments
Mr Leonard (who had been 12 at the time of the accident) argued that the park authority had breached its duties both at common law and under the Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 due to  the presence of hazards and lack of preventative measures on the path. He contended that the steps provided by the park authority were very uneven, inconsistent in shape and sloping downwards at various different angles and also that there were exposed roots and other tripping hazards such as man-made drainage gullies on the steps.  There was also a steep unfenced drop from the path to the public road. Mr Leonard argued that a risk assessment of the type that was standard practice in the design and planning process for any public right of way in open areas would have revealed the need for (amongst other things) a hand rail which would have slowed Mr Leonard’s descent and prevented his fall to the road.

The park authority argued that a hand rail was not required at the relevant part of the path as the gradient was not severe and the drop was less than two metres. They also said that it was likely that a hand rail would be vandalised and would have placed a maintenance risk on them. Further they contended that, given the gradient of the slope and width of the area before the drop, Mr Leonard would not have fallen to the road if he had been descending the path at walking pace.

Decision
Lord Uist found that the circumstances leading to the fall had not been proved but, even if they had been, there would have been no duty on the park authority under the 1960 Act[1]. After considering the authorities (which suggest that, whilst an occupier will have a duty to fence off special or unfamiliar hazards, an occupier will not be liable for obvious dangers), Lord Uist adopted the approach of Lord Emslie in Graham v East of Scotland Water Authority[2]. In Graham, Lord Emslie found that the test of ‘obviousness’ was not per se satisfactory. He noted that the early authorities have used the term ‘obvious’ to denote features of the environment which are “permanent, ordinary and familiar” and went on to say that, whilst natural landscape features plainly fall into that category, so too do long standing artificial features.

Lord Uist then concluded that the path under consideration in this case was:

“a long-standing artificial feature which was neither concealed nor unusual and did not involve exposure to any special or unfamiliar hazard. It had become a permanent, ordinary and familiar feature of the landscape”.

As a result, the park authority owed no duty to Mr Leonard (or anyone else) under 1960 Act in respect of the path.

However, Lord Uist also went further and indicated that, in addition to being inapplicable to long standing features, the occupier’s duty would not apply to other obvious artificial features (even though recently constructed) which have become part of the landscape and which do not involve exposure special or unfamiliar hazards:

“it is not a requirement that the artificial feature be well established or long standing before the principle[3] of Stevenson[4] and Taylor[5] applies: it is sufficient that it is obvious, part of the landscape and does not involve exposure to any special or unfamiliar hazard. If, for example, an accident happened a week after an obvious artificial feature which became part of the landscape (such as a pond, swimming pool or path) had been constructed I see no reason why the principle in Stevenson and Taylor should not apply. Of course, by its very nature, the path in this case presented a danger in the form of the risk of tripping or slipping, but that is a risk which those venturing upon the hill must be taken to have accepted. Adapting the words of Lord Hutton in Tomlinson[6], it would be contrary to common sense, and therefore not sound law, to expect the defenders to provide protection to members of the public (by means of a handrail or barrier or anything else) against such an obvious danger. The fact that [Mr Leonard] was aged only 12 at the time is of no relevance to the issue of the existence of a duty on the [park authority].”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

(See appeal to Inner House here.)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Sheriff Court case in which Mr Heary sought damages after suffering injury when climbing over a locked gate whilst attempting to leave a breakers yard he had been visiting.

Facts
Mr Phinn carried on a business known as Phinn Parts Auto Breakers from a yard in Dundee. Mr Heary had arrived at the yard and was directed by Mr Phinn to the part of the yard where he might find the parts he was looking for. Shortly afterwards, Mr Phinn left the yard and went home. Before leaving, Mr Phinn’s son had entered the yard and shouted to ask if anyone was there but had received no answer. When Mr Heary sought to leave the yard, he found that there was nobody else in the yard and that a communal gate, shared with four or five neighbouring businesses, was locked. He then attempted to climb over the gate to get out but fell. Mr Phinn denied locking the gate (he, along with the proprietors of the other yards, held keys to it) and it was not established who had done so.

Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960
When considering Mr Phinn’s potential liability under the Occupier’s Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, the sheriff found that, although Mr Phinn was not the owner of the communal gate, he was an occupier in terms of the Act by reason of the control he exercised over the access. However, it was found that a gate operating normally could not be said to constitute a danger and accordingly there was no obligation on Mr Phinn under the Act.

Common Law
In contrast, it was found that, as Mr Phinn invited people on to the premises, he owed Mr Heary a duty to take reasonable care for his safety at common law. It was foreseeable that, if Mr Phinn allowed Mr Heary to be locked into the yard, he might injure himself whilst taking steps to escape. It was also foreseeable that, even if Mr Phinn did not lock the gate himself, one of the occupiers of the neighbouring yards may have done so. There was therefore a duty on Mr Phinn to take reasonable care to ensure that no one was left in the yard when he vacated it. The sheriff found that, although a check may have been carried out, given the size of the yard, the check had been inadequate. That failure to carry out an adequate check had caused Mr Heary’s injuries. However, after taking account of the fact that the incident had taken place during the day, the fact that the site was not completely isolated and that Mr Heary had decided to climb the gate (which was a significant obstacle) after waiting only 25 minutes, the sheriff found that there had been contributory negligence on the part of Mr Heary and reduced the award of damages by 50%.

 The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case considering a claim for damages under the Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. Mr Dawson worked as a self employed courier and was delivering a package to Ms Page’s cottage. Building works were taking place at the cottage and the surroundings resembled a building site.  After making two unsuccessful visits to the cottage to deliver the package, Mr Dawson left the package under an oil storage tank in the back garden. As he was leaving the cottage he slipped on a wet plank over a trench in the garden and injured his hand.

Mr Dawson’s claim for damages failed in the Outer House.  After noting wet planks are slippery and a notice is not required to point that out, Lord Glennie found that there was no requirement on Ms Page to exclude people from the site or give warning of the risks. The Inner House observed that the fundamental aim of the 1960 Act had been to the restore a broad test of reasonableness in relation to such claims and rejected Mr Dawson’s appeal which was based the argument that Lord Glennie should not have reached the conclusion that a state of affairs which is obvious is not a danger.

The full decision is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case in which Ms Kirkham sought damages from her Landlords after she tripped and fell over uneven paving slabs on her garden path. She relied both on the terms of her lease and the Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. The claim had been rejected in the Outer House and was appealed to the Inner House.

Lease
In terms of the lease, Link undertook to:

1. Clause 5.3
   “carry out all repairs within a reasonable period of becoming aware that repairs need to be done”
2. Clause 5.4
   “carry out inspections, at reasonable intervals, of the common parts”.
3. Clause 5.8
   “keep in repair the structure and exterior of the house, including … pathways, steps or other means of access …”

 Taking each of the clauses in turn the Inner house agreed with the findings of the Outer House:

1. Clause 5.3 did not come into play unless Link was made aware of a repair requiring to be done (which had not been done). Also, on a proper construction of the clause, Ms Kirkham could not rely upon deemed knowledge.
2. Ms Kirkham’s garden path was not a common part. It was not a “common facility” shared by other tenants or residents, but rather was a dedicated access to Ms Kirkham’s property.
3. Clause 5.8 did not impose any repair obligation over and above what was to be found elsewhere in the tenancy agreement or in statute. The words “take reasonable care” did not require to be read into the clause so that there could be argued to be a breach of a duty to take reasonable care by failing to inspect the pathway regularly.

Occupiers Liability
In terms of sections 2 and 3 of the 1960 Act, Ms Kirkham was entitled to such care as, in all the circumstances of the case, was reasonable to ensure that she would not suffer injury or damage by reason of danger arising from the state of the premises. In order to succeed, Ms Kirkham would have had to establish Link’s failure to take reasonable care for her safety.  For example, she would require to show a failure to set up an adequate system of inspection, or failure to properly implement a system of inspection which was already in place.

However, in this case Mrs Kirkham failed to provide evidence as to what other landlords in the same situation as Link did by way of periodic inspection. Therefore it was not apparent what Link required to do in relation to the footpath. On the evidence available, it had not been established that the system undertaken was inadequate.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case concerning an alleged breach of duty under the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 at Lakeland’s store on Hanover Street in Edinburgh. Miss Brown argued that a two-fold failure by Lakeland to install a handrail and to signpost an existing alternative exit on George Street (which had a ramp and handrail) resulted in her falling down a flight of stairs at the Hanover Street exit.

Whether or not Lakeland had breached its statutory duty depended on whether it had been negligent. The question for the court was whether Lakeland had done or omitted to do something which had, as its reasonable and probable consequence, injury to others. This was a matter of fact and circumstance. Consideration was given to the knowledge and magnitude of the risk and the practicality and effectiveness of preventative measures.

Lord Woolman found that Lakeland had not been negligent. As regards knowledge of the risk, it was noted that there had been no history of accident amongst perhaps 3 million persons to have visited the store. In relation to magnitude of the risk, there was no risk of falling far (Miss Brown had fallen four or five steps). With regard to practicality of preventative measures, Lakeland had already established a disabled entrance (on George Street) which complied with the relevant legislation and had taken steps to bring its existence to the notice of customers. As to effectiveness of preventative measures, there was no evidence that, had Lakeland installed a handrail at the Hanover Street entrance, it would have prevented Miss Brown’s accident. Further, Lord Woolman also took account of  the expert evidence of two architects which indicated that it was unclear whether planning permission would have been granted for a handrail.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case considering a claim for damages under the Occupiers Liability (Scotland) Act 1960. Mr Dawson worked as a self employed courier and was delivering a package to Ms Page’s cottage. Building works were taking place at the cottage and the surroundings resembled a building site.  After making two unsuccessful visits to the cottage to deliver the package, Mr Dawson left the package under an oil storage tank in the back garden. As he was leaving the cottage he slipped on a wet plank over a trench in the garden and injured his hand.

Mr Dawson’s claim for damages failed because the wet plank did not constitute a danger, and, even if it did, there was no requirement on Ms Page to exclude people from the site or give warning of the risks.

Lord Glennie observed:

“Wet planks may be slippery. A notice is not required to point that out. Such dangers, if they be dangers, send out their own warning. The pursuer observed that the plank looked slippery. What more would a notice have told him? Accordingly, I reject the submission that the defender was required, in the exercise of any duty under the Act to take reasonable care, to exclude people from the site or to put up a notice warning of whatever danger was posed by the plank walkway.”

The full decision is available from Scottish Courts here.

(See appeal to Inner House here)

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.