The mother of Private Mark Connolly has withdrawn her appeal. This effectively brings this long running family dispute to an end.
Links to my earlier blogs on this matter can be found here. Links to my two two articles published in Journal of the Law Society of Scotland can be found here and here.
An executor, the daughter of a woman whose late mother was injured in a fall, can proceed with a claim for damages despite the fact the action was raised more than three years after the incident.
The full judgement can be found here.
The First-tier Tribunal has held that the executors of a deceased individual who had incurred capital losses during his lifetime were able to claim relief for those losses against income and capital gains that had arisen before his death.
The full case report can be found here.
This is a Note by Sheriff A G McCulloch in the matter of a petition for the appointment as executor dative by Dennis Murray.
Mr Murray is one of four children of the deceased. The widow of the deceased was made the subject of a guardianship order. Mr Murray was appointed as her guardian.
As the widow’s prior rights would exhaust the whole estate of the deceased, the normal procedure would have been for the widow or her guardian to be appointed as executor dative. However, the guardianship order in this case unusually did not contain a power for the guardian to make an application for appointment as executor dative.
The Sheriff explained in his Note that the problem here was the current commissary practice. The current practice is to treat the surviving spouse whose prior rights exhaust the whole intestate estate as the sole person with the right to be appointed executor. The Sheriff noted that this appeared “to be a misunderstanding, or misreading, of the provisions of section 9(4) [of the Succession (Scotland) Act.]“
The Sheriff’s Note which can be found here outlines the relevant part of section 9(4).
The Sheriff held that “… those other than the surviving spouse may seek in these circumstances to be decerned executor dative.”
This case concerns a matter that had not previously come before the Scottish courts.
The facts of this case were not in dispute and were set out in a joint minute agreed by the parties. Miss Isabella Gordon granted a Power of Attorney in 1996 in favour of her solicitor. This included the power to sell any part of her estate. In 1997 she executed a Will in which she bequeathed her home in Stonehaven to John Turner. In 2001 Miss Gordon became incapable of managing her own affairs and moved into a nursing home. Her Attorney sold her home later on that year. Miss Gordon died in 2008.
The question for Lord Tyre was whether the legacy of the house was “adeemed” or was it “converted”, so that the beneficiary is entitled to a sum equivalent to the proceeds of sale of the house.
“Where the subject matter of a bequest (whether heritable or moveable) has been disposed of by the testator so that it no longer forms part of his or her estate at the date of death, the bequest or legacy is said to have been adeemed and therefore cannot take effect.”
Lord Tyre also made the following point: “In contrast to the doctrine of conversation, the intention of the testator is not regarded as relevant to ademption.”
The crucial point here appeared to be that the parties agreed the following: “The sale of the house by [the attorney] was a prudent act of administration, having regard to the disadvantage in leaving the house empty with attendant maintenance costs. It was not a necessary act, not having been an act which [Miss Gordon] as principal, had she been sui juris ["full legal capacity"], would have been constrained to effect, there being sufficient other funds available to meet the costs of [Miss Gordon's] care.”
Lord Tyre held that as the sale of the house by the Attorney was a prudent act of administration rather than a necessary act to fund Miss Gordon’s care, the legacy was not adeemed by the sale. John Turner was therefore “entitled to receive a cash equivalent to the proceeds of sale of the house.” In addition he is entitled “to receive a sum representing the fruits of these proceeds during the period since the date of receipt of the sale proceeds.”
One last point on expenses. Lord Tyre agreed that both parties were entitled to their expenses from the executry estate.
Thanks to Gillian Campbell of Biggart Baillie and Nicola Smith of Cairn Legal for tweeting about this case.
The case report can be found here.
This is another case involving a family dispute over the corpse. In this case it was over the corpse of a Filipino politician and was heard before the High Court of England and Wales.
In coming to its decision the England and Wales High Court placed great emphasis on “… his clearly expressed wishes both demonstrated in evidence and by signed documents.”
The case report can be found here.
Mrs SC for Judicial Review of a decision of the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency of the Ministry of Defence Outer House, Court of Session, [2011] CSOH 124
The background to this case is a family dispute. In this case the dispute is over where the body of Private Mark Connolly (MC) will be buried. MC’s mother wishes to have him buried in Methil. His widow wishes him to be buried in Forfar.
The petitioner in this matter is the widow of MC. MC died on 14 May 2011 whilst on a training course in Germany. MC named his mother and brother as his executors in his will. MC’s widow is the sole beneficiary.
It appears that the MOD initially wished to release MC’s body to MC’s widow. It was only when MC’s mother disputed the funeral arrangements, and after looking at MC’s will, that the MOD indicated that they would now release the body to MC’s mother. At that point the Forfar funeral arrangements were almost complete.
MC’s widow maintained that although MC did not leave written instructions regarding his funeral he made his wishes known to her. MC told her that he wished to be buried but not in Methil. He wished to be buried wherever he and his wife were settled. They had settled in Forfar.
The MOD indicated its change of mind in a letter to MC’s widow dated 6 June 2011. It is respect of this letter that MC’s widow sought judicial review.
Lord Brodie began by looking at the issue of competency.
“Critically, nothing in the letter of 6 June 2011 affects the rights or interests of anyone and indeed it does not purport to do so. It neither constitutes nor expresses a decision. All that there is in the letter is a statement of intention to transfer custody of the body to the other party that the writer of the letter understands is entitled to its custody as a matter of law. Whether or not that understanding is correct, neither the writing of the letter nor the implement of the intention expressed in any way alters parties’ respective rights or interests. Were it to be the case that the petitioner is entitled as a matter of law to demand custody of the body, neither the letter nor a transfer to the second respondent in implement of the intention expressed in the letter would affect that. Put shortly, in my opinion there is nothing here to judicially review. I recognise that in similar circumstances in England that courts may take an approach to applications for judicial review which is more pragmatic and closer to what parties would have wished me to do here …, but the nature of the equivalent English jurisdiction is different from that in Scotland.”
Although Lord Brodie decided to dismiss the petition as incompetent he decided to address the petitioner’s claim that the decision of the MOD contravenes her rights under article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Indeed Lord Brodie went as far as to say that: “I may be wrong on my conclusion as to competency.”
Article 8 claim
Article 8 of the Convention provides:
MC’s widow contends that her article 8.1 rights are engaged because the decision of which she complains deprives her of the opportunity of taking custody of her husband’s body, arranging his funeral and determining where he is interred.
Lord Brodie split his analysis into three parts. (1) Whether there had been interference with the petitioner’s rights under article 8.1, (2) whether any interference was according to law and (3) whether such interference was justified by any of the other provisions of article 8.2
Interference
On the question of whether there had been interference, Lord Brodie proceeded “upon the basis that transfer of the deceased’s body would amount to an interference with [MC's widow's] article 8.1 right to respect for family life.”
According to law
Lord Brodie then discussed what he thought was the position under both English and Scots law.
Under English law the executor has priority when it comes to funeral arrangements but that this right may be restricted by the courts. Lord Brodie noted that there is no direct authority on this point under Scots law.
The case of Evans v McIntyre was though discussed and Lord Brodie noted some of Sheriff Scott’s comments in that case:
“On the basis of the authorities to which I was referred and the submissions I heard, I would see that there is no question but that a confirmed executor or someone who entitled to be confirmed as an executor and who intends to seek confirmation (the prospective executor) is a lawful custodier of the body of a deceased for the purpose of burial.”
Lord Brodie, however, did not feel “that matters are as cut-and-dried” as in Evans and noted:
“The fact that he [the executor] pays does not make him responsible for arranging the funeral. It is the surviving spouse and next of kin (not the executor) who have rights to solatium for unauthorised interference with the dead body.”
“Thus, in Scots law, I would see near relatives as well as the executor or prospective executor as having rights and interests in respect of the body of the deceased. The nature of these rights is not the same.”
“Determining what are appropriate funeral arrangements by reference to the quality of relationships within a family appears to me a task for which the court is quite unsuited.”
The “intends to seek confirmation” comment from the Evans case, see above, is also important as interestingly Lord Brodie was not certain that MC’s mother would be appointed as executor due to her answer to his question on her being confirmed as executor. MC’s mother said she would take legal advice before deciding.
Other provisions of Article 8.2
“To respect the rights of both the [the MOD] cannot avoid favouring one.“ Lord Brodie felt that the MOD were in an impossible position and that its actions were justified under Article 8.2.
In summing up Lord Brodie said:
“The first respondent [the MOD] may therefore lawfully transfer the body of the deceased to the second respondent [MC’s mother] but he may also lawfully transfer the body to the petitioner [MC’s widow]. Nothing in this decision should be construed as an expression of preference of my part of the position of the second respondent [MC’s mother] over that of the petitioner [MC’s widow].”
Conclusion
Although Lord Brodie held the petition to be incompetent he helpfully continued with his analysis of the matter. Lord Brodie saw that the MOD were in an almost impossible position here. Whatever it did the other party would feel aggrieved.
One final point. I was surprised that more was not made on the fact that MC did not appoint his widow as an executor because of erroneous advice from the army. The army it was claimed had told MC that it was not appropriate to appoint the same person as executor and beneficiary.
The full case report can be found here.
