All we need is “ze fallen Madonna with ze big boobies” and it could be an episode of Allo, Allo. Instead, this is a case concerning an appeal by the Procurator Fiscal of Aberdeen against a sheriff’s decision on the grounds of bias.

The case involved Chief Inspector Thomas Forrester who was charged with dangerous driving[1] after allegedly instructing a constable driving a police car, in which he was travelling to catch a plane, to put the sirens on and move to the wrong side of the road. When the constable did so, a collision occurred between two cars travelling in the opposite direction.

During a delay in proceedings, the sheriff called the procurator fiscal’s depute and the defence counsel into chambers to inquire as to progress and was told by the procurator fiscal’s depute that, amongst other witnesses waiting to be called, were the police officers who interviewed Chief Inspector Forrester. The sheriff then remarked “Oh that will be the Gestapo!”

The sheriff ultimately found that the interview of Chief Inspector Forrester by the investigating officers was unfair and excluded it as evidence. The Procurator Fiscal appealed to the High Court on the basis that the sheriff’s remarks inferred bias and, his decision to exclude the interview as evidence, disclosed actual bias.

The High Court refused the Appeal.  In coming to its conclusion, the High Court referred to Wallace v Thomson (2009):

 “[18] Humour is not without its place in the criminal courts. No doubt, when used by a judge or sheriff, it requires to be used sparingly, with caution and not inappropriately. However, a Sheriff may consider that an element of levity might be temporarily introduced for a particular purpose; perhaps to put a nervous witness at his ease or to defuse a moment of unnecessary tension between procurators. No doubt, if the Court turned a trial into something akin to a comedy, an accused would have grounds of complaint were he to be convicted. Nothing of that kind has occurred in this case. The Sheriff appears to have made one flippant remark intended to be humorous. Perhaps it was; although it seems to have lost something in its translation to the printed page. The suggestion that an informed and reasonable observer would consider that this was an element demonstrating partiality is without foundation”.

Similar considerations, held the High Court, applied with regard to the sheriff’s comments in this case.  It was “bordering on the ludicrous” to suggest that the sheriff was actually comparing the behaviour of the police officers with that of the Gestapo during the Second World War. On hearing the words used in context, there was no prospect of a fair minded individual concluding that the sheriff was biased against the procurator fiscal and, having regard to the way the sheriff approached the objection to the admissibility of the interview and the reasoning he employed, there was also no prospect that a fair minded individual would form the view that the sheriff was biased when deciding the issue.

It was noted (the court’s opinion being delivered by Lord Carloway):

“An allegation that a judicial office holder is biased against the Crown, in the form of the local procurator fiscal, and investigating police officers is an extremely serious one. It should only be made where there is evidence to support it.  Such evidence is not present in this case..”

With regard to the interview, the issue was whether the sheriff had erred in determining that the Crown had failed to demonstrate that the interview had been fair and that admissions made had been spontaneous and voluntary. The sheriff had rejected evidence of the detective chief superintendent who conducted the interview to the effect that the interviews purpose had been to allow the chief inspector to tell his side of the story. Instead the sheriff concluded, from the manner of the interview and the surrounding circumstances[2], that the true intention had been to prompt the chief inspector into making an admission. On reaching that conclusion the sheriff was bound to sustain the objection to the interview as evidence. Authority for that finding came from Chalmers v HMA (1954) and the words of Lord Justice General (Cooper):

 “It is not the function of the police… to direct their endeavours to obtaining a confession from the suspect to be used as evidence against him at the trial”

 Herr Flick would not have approved.

A full report of the decision is available from Scottish Courts here.

Case considering the grant of planning permission for a wind farm at Fallago Rig in the Lammermuir Hills.  Due to the large capacity of the development, consent was required by the Scottish Ministers in terms of the Electricity Act 1989. Consent was granted by the Scottish Ministers by a decision letter in November 2010. In terms of the legislation that consent is also deemed to be planning permission for the development.

There were a number of interested parties who objected to the development leading to two public enquiries and what is described as voluminous correspondence.  The petitioners sought reduction of the decision letter on various reasons (including natural justice, ultra vires, unlawful conditions and inadequate reasons), however, the main thrust of their argument was bias.

The petitioners argued that, while it was quite lawful for elected representatives to be predisposed to renewable energy (it being Government policy to encourage the development and use of renewable energy from natural sources), it was not lawful to pre-determine an application which fits that policy without first considering the objections. In this case the petitioners argued that the government had made up their mind to bring about the conditions in which consent could be granted. They argued that the Government had had covert conversations with the MOD (which was the main objector to the development on the basis that the turbines could interfere with radar systems) and those conversations were successful as the MOD withdrew its objection. This, they argued, showed bias.

After detailed consideration of the authorities Lord McEwan looked to the test for bias in Porter v Magill (2002) in which Lord Hope came to the conclusion the test was:

“… whether the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that …” (the decision taker) “… was biased”

Lord McEwan took the view that the best guidance on the application of that test to a planning case was given in R (Lewis)v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council (2009) which made it clear that a Minister’s position is different from someone holding a judicial or quasi judicial office:

“… the requirement made of such decision makers is not, it seems to me, to be impartial but to address the planning issues before them fairly and on their merits, even though they may approach them with a predisposition in favour of one side of the argument or the other. It is noticeable that in the present case no complaint is raised by reference to the merits of the planning issues. The complaint, on the contrary, is essentially as to the timing of the decision in the context of some diffuse allegations of political controversy. So the test would be whether there is an appearance of predetermination in the sense of a mind closed to the planning merits of the decision in question. Evidence of political affiliation or of the adoption of policies towards a planning proposal will not for these purposes by itself amount to an appearance of the real possibility of predetermination or what counts as bias for these purposes. Something more is required… ‘ unless there is positive evidence to show that there was indeed a closed mind, I do not think that prior observations or apparent favouring of a particular decision will suffice to persuade a court to quash the decision … “

After considering the documents and evidence, Lord McEwan found that, far from showing pre-determination on the part of the Minister, there was a great deal to indicate the opposite i.e. an open fair mind. He also failed to find that the conduct of the Minister could be criticised noting that “in the realm of administrative law there is nothing wrong with the decision taker meeting an objector.”

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.