English Court of Appeal case concerning leases of commercial premises at 104 Cromer Street and at 106/108 Cromer Street in London. The subjects in both leases included the ground and basement premises but not the upper floors (which consisted of residential flats retained by the Landlord) nor the soil pipes on the rear wall of the building which served the upper floors.

The leases contained an obligation on the tenant to put and keep the subjects in good and substantial repair, decoration and condition. There was no corresponding obligation on the landlord to repair the parts of the building it had retained; the landlord’s only express obligations being in relation to insurance (of both the premises and the retained subjects) and allowing the tenant quiet enjoyment of the premises.  A cesser of rent clause (i.e. ceasing liability for rent) also applied in the event the premises (or any part of them) were unfit for occupation and use.

The premises were damaged on at least 4 occasions between April 2004 and June 2005 by water and sewerage coming from the parts of the property retained by the landlord. The damage was repaired and insurance payments made. The tenant continued to pay the rent until June 2008 then stopped. The landlord took steps to forfeit the leases and re-enter the premises. The tenant argued that, as she had continued to pay the rent during the period in 2005 when the premises had been (in the tenant’s opinion) unfit for use, she was entitled to set that off against the rent due in 2008. The tenant also sought substantial damages for financial losses (including loss of business) arising from the leaks.

In order to succeed in such a claim the tenants had to establish a breach of duty on the part of the landlord in either contract or in delict arising from the various leaks. The basis of such liability was said to be either an implied obligation to keep the retained parts in repair or alternatively a common law duty as adjoining occupier to remedy any defect in those premises which was capable of causing damage to the leased subjects.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no reason to require the implication of an obligation on the landlord to keep the retained subjects in good repair. Although there was no express repairing obligation imposed on the landlord, the repair of the structure of the building was catered for through the provisions of the insurance clause. In the face of these provisions there was no reason based on necessity or business efficacy to alter the balance of the scheme by imposing an implied obligation to repair on the landlord, let alone one (as was argued for by the tenant) under which his liability to repair was absolute.

For much the same reasons, the existence of what the parties obviously intended should be a comprehensive scheme for the repair of both the leased subjects and the retained parts of the building was sufficient to exclude any liability in delict to which the landlord might otherwise be subject to in relation to the retained premises.

The full judgement is available from BAILII here*.

*We believe that the tenant disputes the facts as reported in the judgment (see here) and is appealing the case to the Supreme Court.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in which Whyte and Mackay sought to enforce an adjudicator’s decision requiring Blyth & Blyth to pay them almost £3m in damages.

Blyth & Blyth had designed the structure of a new bottling plant at Whyte and Mackay’s Grangemouth premises. Whyte and Mackay claimed that the foundations were defective and would result in settlement and damage to the building. They referred the resulting dispute to an adjudicator (as they were entitled to do in terms of the contract between the parties)[1].

When Whyte and Mackay sought to enforce the adjudicator’s decision in the Court of Session, Blyth & Blyth argued that the adjudicator had failed to give adequate reasons for his determination and that to enforce the decision was incompatible with Blyth & Blyth’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

Reasons for the decision
Lord Malcolm found that the adjudicator had failed to give adequate reasons for his determination as he had failed to deal with Blyth & Blyth’s contention that, even if the additional piling deemed necessary to make the foundations adequate had been specified in their design, Whyte and Mackay would not have been prepared to pay the additional time and financial costs required to carry out the extra work. This was potentially a complete answer to the claim and a very significant omission from the adjudicator’s decision. As such, it was sufficient to justify reduction of the award.

Human Rights
Arguably of more importance, however, was Lord Malcolm’s finding that to enforce the adjudicator’s award would be a disproportionate interference with Blyth and Blyth’s right to their possessions under article 1 of the first protocol to the Convention on Human Rights.  Lord Malcolm observed that adjudication is a “rough and ready” process which is “designed to provide a speedy and relatively cheap provisional award pending a final determination by litigation, arbitration or agreement”; the “rough and ready” aspect being particularly true in large and relatively complicated cases such as this one. He also noted judicial concerns as to whether difficult questions of law should be referred to adjudication. Whilst a court, in the face of a Convention challenge, will usually be able to justify enforcement of an adjudicator’s award on the basis of the general interest benefits arising from adjudication (e.g. speed, cost, efficiency and cash-flow requirements), this was a case where such benefits were largely, if not entirely absent. No general or public interest had been served by Whyte and Mackay taking the dispute to adjudication (it would be many years until the cost savings gained by the absence of piling would be outweighed by the projected losses and the bulk of the claimed losses would not occur until 2035/6).

In coming to this conclusion, Lord Malcolm also dismissed Whyte and Mackay’s argument that a decision not to enforce the adjudicator’s award on the basis of article 1 of the first protocol would undermine the whole adjudication scheme, finding such a contention to be “exaggerated and unconvincing”.

A further challenge to the award under article 6 of the Convention (the right to a fair hearing) was rejected on the basis that article 6 is only engaged when a civil right or obligation is being determined and an adjudication cannot be regarded as a final determination of the right or obligation at stake.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Inner House case relating to an agreement for lease of subjects at the Maxim office park in North Lanarkshire. Tritax were owners of the development and Regus were to take a lease of part of the development. Monies were to be made available to Regus in respect of its fit out costs as an incentive.  Regus did not comply with restrictions on the type of tenant imposed by sale agreements and so HUB (a company created to run the restaurant and other facilities at the development) was interposed to sub-let to Regus.

In terms of the agreement for lease, HUB were to deliver a letter to Regus (although the letter was not addressed to Regus) from the Bank of Scotland relating to sums which the Bank held on deposit in respect of the fit out costs. This letter formed the crux of the case and was in the following terms:

“We understand that Heads of Terms have been agreed between TAL CPT and Regus (Maxim) Limited for the lease of the first floor of Building 1 at Maxim.

It may assist the proposed tenant to have confirmation from us that, on behalf of the landlord (Tritax Eurocentral EZ Unit Trust) and TAL CPT, we hold the sum of £913,172 to meet the landlord’s commitment to fit-out costs. These funds will be released in accordance with the drawdown procedure agreed between the parties, whereby the proposed tenant’s contractors will issue monthly certificates.

This is subject always to agreement of wider commercial terms with the incoming tenant.”

Regus carried out the fitting out works and issued invoices to HUB who confirmed that the costs were properly incurred and that the contribution should be paid to Regus. However, the bank refused to release the costs as there had been a default in the facility agreement and they were exercising a right of retention over the sums referred to in the letter.   Regus sued for payment of the costs from the bank. In the Outer House Lord Menzies had dismissed the action. He found that he was unable to construe the letter as amounting to a unilateral undertaking by the bank of a legally enforceable obligation to pay the sum to Regus. On appeal to the Inner House, Regus relied on two arguments:

1. The letter was an undertaking in terms of which the bank were obliged to make payment.
2. That the letter contained negligent misrepresentations acted on by Regus to its detriment and the bank were obliged to make reparation to the Regus for breach of a duty of care.

The court rejected Regus’s appeal. For a promissory obligation of the type argued for by Regus, clear words are required. The letter merely confirmed that, at the date of the letter, the bank held the funds on behalf of Tritax and TAL (the developer/development manager). It did not contain an unconditional obligation on the bank to pay the funds to Regus on demand as the bank’s own debt. The bank’s freedom to pay out the money would depend on the terms and conditions on which it held the funds and the letter also spelt out that release of the money was governed by an agreed procedure. In addition, the sentence referring to wider commercial terms made it plain that the confirmation was not unconditional. For the same reasons, whilst the letter made the representation that the bank held the funds; it did not make a representation that the money would be released whatever the circumstances when Regus came to demand payment.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Case from the Court of Appeal for England and Wales concerning a developer’s claim for damages against a consulting engineer who failed to perform tasks by an agreed date. The developer (a farmer) sought damages in respect of the fall in the value of his development (due to the property slump) during the period of the delay.

In terms of an oral agreement (followed by a formal letter of engagement) reached with the developer on 6 September 2006, the engineer was to design a road and drainage to the developer’s site and to obtain s38 approval (allowing adoption of the road by the roads authority in terms of the Highways Act 1980) by March 2007. An initial s38 approval was not obtained until 17 February 2008 and even then some parts had not been finalised. In April 2008 the developer engaged another consulting engineer who obtained the necessary approval in June 2008. The judge found that the first engineer’s breach of contract delayed the development by 15 months and that had resulted in loss to the developer because of the reduced value of the development.

The question for the appeal court was whether the developer’s loss was too remote to allow recovery. The appeal court dismissed the engineer’s appeal agreeing with the judge’s finding that that the loss was not too remote as it was reasonably foreseeable as a serious possibility if there was a delay. It also agreed with the judge’s finding that the case was not one of the unusual cases where the nature of the contract and the commercial background, or other relevant special circumstances, mean that an implied assumption of responsibility for losses that can be reasonably foreseen was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal’s comments on the length of delay are also worth noting:

 “It may well be that the reason for the absence of many cases of this kind is that the property market does not move as quickly as certain other types of market involving commodities and other goods, and it takes a very lengthy delay in breach of contract before a provable loss of value can occur. A few days or even a few weeks delay is unlikely to give rise to a demonstrable loss on the property market. It was the appellant’s delay of 15 months, in the Judge’s words an egregious delay, which in the present case gave rise to a quantifiable loss.”

The full judgement is available from BAILII here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case considering the interpretation of a break clause in a lease of premises at Almondvale Office Park in Livingston.

The clause was clear in that CBS (the tenant) was required to serve notice exercising the break and pay a lump sum before terminating the lease. However words had been omitted from a third part of the clause and, although a third and additional requirement appeared to be intended, it was unclear what it was.

CBS sought to exercise the break, served the notice and paid the lump sum. However, RPS (the landlord) argued that CBS had not validly terminated the lease contending that payment in respect of repairs required to be made in terms of the clause before CBS could terminate. (A schedule of dilapidations had been served on CBS by RPS prior to the termination but the parties had been unable to agree the sum due.) In RPS’s view the third part of the clause had three possible meanings. These were that: prior to the termination date, the tenant had to either (a) pay and perform all its obligations in full; or (b) pay all its monetary obligations; or (c) pay all sums over and above the lump sum.

In the first place Lord Woolman found that omission of words left the third part of clause with no natural meaning. In the second place, when considering what a reasonable person would have understood the clause to mean, although use of the words “in addition” did indicate that a third requirement was intended, omission of the words meant that it was not clear what the requirement was (the fact that RPS had offered three possible meanings in itself suggested this).  As such, it was not possible to interpret the clause as imposing a third obligation on CBS prior to termination of the lease.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case concerning arbitration proceedings in respect of a lease over Pentlandfield business park at Roslin in Midlothian. Midlothian Innovation let the premises from Robert W Ferguson & Co.

The lease was for 5 years and included an option to purchase as at 1 July 2007. The parties had also signed a minute of agreement. Both of the documents stipulated that, if the option were exercised, Robert W Ferguson would grant a renunciation of the lease.  Midlothian exercised the option on 1 December 2006 and a renunciation was signed on 2 July 2007. However, on 16 August 2007 both parties signed a joint application form seeking the appointment of an arbitrator in respect of a dispute over compliance with the repairing obligations in the lease. The arbitration proceeded slowly but in 2011 Robert Ferguson (the surviving partner of the firm of Robert W Ferguson & Co) changed his position and argued that, given the granting of the renunciation, the arbitrator had no power to make an award.

Lord Woolman rejected that argument. Although the acceptance of a renunciation by a landlord implies a discharge of all claims against the tenant, the renunciation is potentially subject to any further agreement made by the parties. The parties had freedom of contract and were entitled to agree not only that they had a dispute arising out of the lease, but also that they wished to resolve it by arbitration. The signing of the joint application form demonstrated the parties’ intention to have the dispute referred to arbitration and Mr Ferguson’s participation in the proceedings until 2011 implied that he consented to the arbitration. Lord Woolman found that the arbitrator had jurisdiction and the proceedings should proceed to a conclusion.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

(See also related decision here).

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in which the Scottish Ministers sought an interim order bringing to an end a prohibition under regulation 47(10) of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006. The prohibition prevented the Ministers from entering contracts relating to the provision of services in relation to trunk roads.

In November 2010, the Ministers (acting through Transport Scotland) advertised two contracts for the management, maintenance and improvement of trunk roads. After adopting the competitive dialogue procedure the Ministers invited tenders. Amey and three other operators submitted tenders. However, the Ministers wrote to Amey advising that they considered Amey’s tender to be abnormally low. They stated that this presented them with unacceptable financial, operational and reputational risks in fulfilling their statutory duties. They considered that Amey had manipulated the prices and rates and explained their concerns in some detail. Correspondence followed in which Amey argued that it had taken a “holistic approach to the tender” and provided price and other information. However, the Ministers rejected Amey’s bid concluding that the offer: (a) carried significant unacceptable risks; (b) was neither economically viable nor sustainable; and (c) was not genuine.”

Noting that Courts function was limited reviewing the Ministers’ decision solely to see whether or not there is a manifest error and/or whether the process was in some way unfair, Lord Hodge saw no legal basis on which Amey could challenge the Minister’s conclusion that its offer (a) carried unacceptable risks for them and (b) was neither economically viable or sustainable. However, if by concluding that the offer was not genuine, the Scottish Ministers were suggesting that the offer was a sham that was more problematic. Lord Hodge though did not consider that that was what was meant. The bids were assessed on the “Comparative Cost of Tender” which was a figure based on prices and rates entered by the tenderers. Lord Hodge interpreted the use of the word “genuine” as referring to the way in which Amey chose to present its offer, noting that the prices and rates Amey provided bore little relationship to the turnover that Amey expected from the contract. However, even the Ministers’ use of the term ‘genuine’ had been incorrect, that would not have undermined their conclusions about the risk, economic viability and sustainability of the bid.

With regard to the limited scope of the court’s review, Lord Hodge found that Amey had at best a weak prima face case (for continuing the prohibition). That was an important factor when considering the balance of convenience.  Lord Hodge also took account of the need to avoid delay in the process which would in turn lead to mobilisation issues for the successful contractors and increased costs for both the successful contractor and the Scottish Ministers. On the other hand, if the contract went ahead and Amey subsequently successfully challenged the Ministers decision, it would then have a remedy in damages. Taking these factors into account, Lord Hodge found that the balance of convenience favoured lifting prohibition. He also found that consideration of the public interest favoured lifting the prohibition (noting the need for an effective and non-discriminatory procurement process but also taking account of the need for economic and efficient operation of the procurement process and the need for proper provision of the required services to Scotland’s trunk roads).

Consequently, Lord Hodge granted the Scottish Ministers’ motion and lifted the prohibition preventing Transport Scotland entering the proposed contracts with other contractors.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

Sheriff court case considering the interpretation of missives for a property in Ellon. Missives were concluded on 9 June 2010 and provided for a date of entry of 6 August 2010. The following clauses (from the Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire standard clauses) were incorporated:

 “(i)         So far as the Seller is aware the Property is not affected by:-
…

(g)          any proposals, applications or re-development plans affecting the Property or any adjacent or neighbouring property which could reasonably be considered to be detrimental to the Property.

 (ii)       Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Seller warrants that he has not been served with nor received any neighbour notification notice issued in terms of planning legislation by any third party. If such notice is served on or received by the Seller prior to the date of settlement, the Seller will immediately forward the notice to the Purchaser’s Solicitor. If the proposals contained in the notice would have a materially detrimental effect on the Property the Purchaser will be entitled to resile from the Missives without penalty due to or by either party.”

The sellers then sent the purchasers a letter (dated 27 July) purporting to re-open the missives and changing the date of entry to 5 August 2010. The purchasers replied (on 30 July) accepting the terms of the seller’s letter and again concluding the missives.

When the purchasers moved into the property following settlement they discovered a handwritten note from the sellers attached to a letter (which had been received by the sellers on 15 July) to the sellers from Aberdeenshire Council.  The letter advised that the Council had published the proposed local development plan and that it included a proposal for development on or adjacent to the property. The notice and plan were, it was said, being issued to the sellers in line with regulation 14(2) of the Town and Country Planning (Development Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2008. The purchasers raised an action for breach of contract.

The sellers argued:

1. that the notice was not a “neighbourhood notification notice”; and
2. that the warranty in the missives applied as at the date of conclusion of the “original” missives (5 weeks before the Council’s letter was received) and not as at the date the “amended” missives were concluded (2 weeks after receipt of the letter).

The sheriff principal, agreeing with the sheriff’s interpretation of the missives, rejected these arguments.

The neighbour notification notice
The sellers had argued that “neighbour notification notice” is a term of art derived from the statutory scheme contained in The Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) (Scotland) Order 1992. In terms of that order, the owner of ground required to intimate his intention to develop its property to its neighbours. However, the scheme was changed when the 2008 Regulations (above) came into force, making the local authority responsible for intimating proposed planning developments (and containing no reference to a “neighbourhood notification notice”). The sheriff principal found that, nevertheless, the clause referred to “any neighbour notification”, the word ‘any’ being significant and indicating that the clause was intended to cover planning legislation as a whole[1].

The warranty
As regards the warranty, the sellers argued that the contract was concluded on 9 June and that the sole purpose of the later letters was to amend the date of entry (effectively meaning that the warranty was given as at 9 June). However, the sheriff principal found that the best approach was to consider what the parties intended to be the date at which the warranty was given. The parties agreed that the warranty was as at the date of conclusion of the missives rather than as at the date of the original offer. The effect of the later letters was to create a new date for the conclusion of missives. Thus the natural consequence of amending the date of entry was to create a new date as at which the warranty was given.

The sheriff principal refused the appeal and agreed with the sheriff’s finding to the effect that the sellers were in breach of contract.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Outer House case in which Mr Phimister sued D.M. Hall for professional negligence in respect of a mortgage valuation report carried out on a property in Buckie in Aberdeenshire. The report was prepared in support of Mr Phimister’s application for a residential mortgage over the property. The report valued the property at £230k and noted that the garden ground and surrounding land was said[1] to extend to approximately 1.12 acres whereas in fact it only extended to about 0.66 acres[2].

Mr Phimister contended that DM Hall owed him a duty to check the area as part of their valuation and they were negligent in failing so to do. Whilst the area of the subjects may not have affected the valuation of the subjects for residential purposes (and Mr Phimister did not argue in court that it did), the smaller area severely restricted his opportunity to develop the site.

Lord Glennie found that Mr Phimister’s claim failed. To succeed Mr Phimister had to establish that the discrepancy between the actual acreage and that represented in the sales particulars should have been “obvious” to a surveyor carrying out his valuation with reasonable care. This would depend on the type of survey the surveyor was asked to carry out. Expert evidence agreed that the purpose of a mortgage valuation report was not to check the acreage of the site but to provide a valuation for mortgage purposes. Amortgage valuation report was not the appropriate tool to assess development potential; if the purchaser wanted such an assessment, he should instruct a development appraisal. A surveyor instructed to survey the subjects with a view to ascertaining whether there was room for building a certain number of houses on plots of a certain size would require, in the exercise of reasonable care, to assess the area of the subjects. However, Lord Glennie was not persuaded that a surveyor carrying out a residential mortgage valuation on a site with buildings standing on it would necessarily have been expected to notice that the site was considerably smaller than 1.12 acres. He would not, as Lord Glennie put it, “have been looking at the site through measuring eyes”.

In some cases the acreage of the site may be a relevant factor in assessing the value for mortgage purposes and, in such cases, the surveyor would have to take care to make an accurate measurement, or check a measurement given by another.However, in this case, the value lay in the buildings and not in the size of the plot and it was found that there was no reason to place such a burden on the surveyor.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.

Two Inner House cases in which Cheshire Mortgage and Blemain Finance were the victims of a mortgage fraud and sought to sue the solicitors instructed by the fraudsters  (the banks had instructed separate solicitors) for breach of warranty of authority.

In each case the fraudsters had pretended to be persons owning property which they were seeking to use as security for a loan (of £355,000 in one case and £203,000 in the other).  They had been able to produce evidence of their identity in the form of utility bills and driving licences to their solicitors and to the banks.  In both cases the fraudsters had approached the bank (directly in one case and via a broker in the other) before instructing their solicitors.

The banks argued that, in each case, the solicitors warranted that they had the authority of the individuals who owned the properties over which standard securities were purportedly granted. The solicitors recognised the doctrine of a solicitor giving an implied warranty of authority. However, they contended that it does not go as far as giving a warranty of the identity of the person for whom they act, nor does it include any warranty as to whether he is or is not the owner or occupier of any particular property. In effect the solicitors said that they warranted only that they had authority from persons who were already known to the banks and with whom the banks were already dealing.

Outer house
In the Outer House Lord Glennie found in favour of the solicitors. The circumstances in which the solicitors came to transaction were of particular importance. By the time the solicitors became involved, the banks knew who they were (or who they thought they were) dealing with. They had already made the decision to lend to those individuals. The solicitors had been instructed (by the fraudsters) for the limited purpose of drawing up the loan and security documentation and liaising with the banks’ solicitors.

In one of the cases there was also discussion as to whether the solicitors were liable to the bank in terms of the letter of obligation they had granted. The bank argued that they suffered loss as a result of the solicitors’ failure to procure the title deeds recording the security in terms of the solicitors undertaking. However, Lord Glennie again agreed with the solicitors’ arguments on this point:

1. the letter of obligation was collateral to the principal transaction between the bank and the borrowers and could not be enforced if that principal transaction was void; and
2. in any event, the bank could show no damages flowing from the failure by the solicitor to produce a title encumbered with the Standard Security, since the Standard Security referred to in the letter of obligation was itself void.

 The Inner House refused an appeal of Lord Glennie’s decision.

Inner House –agent’s authority
An agent’s warranty authority is of limited scope. Whilst an agent will impliedly warrant that he has authority to act on his client’s behalf it does not follow that he warrants the identity of his client nor the client’s title to the property in question. Although it would be open to the agent to expressly warrant these things, it is almost inconceivable that the agent would agree to this. The court should not readily impose upon a person rendering professional services an absolute, unqualified obligation amounting, in effect, to a guarantee of his client’s identity and title. Where the risks are commercial risks involved in lending to a person who may not be all he claims to be, there is no reason why the risks should be transferred from a commercial firm to a professional firm such as a firm of solicitors.

Inner House –letter of obligation
The Inner House agreed that the letter of obligation was collateral to the void security transaction (and consequently unenforceable). Also (although it may simply have been another way of expressing the same thing) the Inner House agreed that the bank could show no loss since the obligation to which the letter was ancillary was void.

The full judgement is available from Scottish Courts here.

All of our property and conveyancing case summaries are contained in the LKS Property and Conveyancing Casebook here.