Supreme Court decision considering an appeal from the Inner House in respect of a challenge to the schemes and orders made by the Scottish Ministers (under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984) to allow construction of an Aberdeen bypass.

The bypass, as initially promoted by the Ministers, had its origins in a regional transport strategy published in March 2003 which, in addition to the bypass, had also considered various other proposals for reducing congestion in Aberdeen.  The Ministers decided to undertake the bypass. However, in December 2004, following a campaign against the routing of the bypass via Murtle of Camphill, previously discarded options were reconsidered and became part of a public consultation. Prior to making a decision the Minister for Transport, commissioned a report on an option which was a hybrid of two of these previous options.  That hybrid option (known as the Fastlink) which linked Stonehaven to the bypass was adopted (in December 2005) on the grounds it would also reduce congestion between Stonehaven and Aberdeen on the A90. The ministers then published Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) on the basis that the scheme fell within the scope of the Environmental Assessment Directive.

Following objections from Mr Walton[1] and others, a public inquiry was held into environmental and technical issues concerning the bypass. However it did not consider the more fundamental question of whether the bypass should be built at all.  Litigation then followed through the courts.

In the Supreme Court, Mr Walton’s primary contention was that the Fastlink was adopted without the public consultation required under the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive[2].  Mr Walton also argued that common law principles of fairness required that the public inquiry should have considered the (economic, social or strategic) justifications for building the Fastlink.  Although Mr Walton only sought to quash the schemes and orders in so far as they concern the Fastlink, the Ministers maintained that if the schemes and orders were to be quashed to any extent, the scheme for the bypass would fall as a whole.

Requirement for a Strategic Environmental Assessment
In coming to its conclusion, the court took account of the differences between EIAs and Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs). It was noted that the EIA Directive is concerned with the assessment of the effects of “projects” on the environment. The SEA Directive, which was adopted 16 years later, is concerned with the environmental assessment of “plans and programmes” (which set the framework of future development consent of “projects”) and is intended to give consideration to environmental considerations at an earlier stage in the process[3].

The Supreme Court considered that, whereas the regional transport strategy (in March 2003) was a “plan or programme” in terms of the SEA Directive, the Fastlink was neither a “plan or programme” nor a “modification”[4] to a “plan or a programme” and did not trigger the consultation requirements under the SEA Directive.  It was instead a modification to a “project” and thus subject to the EIA Directive rather than the SEA Directive.

Compliance with common law principles of fairness
With regard to the common law principles of fairness concerning the holding of the public inquiry, in terms of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, the Ministers are under a duty to hold an inquiry if an objection is made to an order or scheme by any person who requires notification of the scheme (in terms of the 1984 Act) or any other person appearing to them to be affected.

As Mr Walton did not require to be notified of the scheme and nothing before the court indicated that he was regarded as a person affected, there was no suggestion that the Ministers were statutorily obliged to hold an inquiry into his objections. There was also no suggestion that he had any legitimate expectation that the remit of the inquiry would encompass the (economic, policy or strategic justifications) for building the Fastlink. No material before the court suggested that the Ministers were bound as a matter of fairness to include the justifications for the building of the Fastlink within the remit of the inquiry.

Whether remedies should have been available to Mr Walton
In the Inner House it had been observed that:

1.  if Mr Walton’s contentions had been accepted, the court would have exercised its discretion (under to the 1984 Act) to decline to grant him a remedy, the court noting that it was not contended that the schemes and orders would substantially prejudice his interests or affect his property;
2. Mr Walton was not a “person aggrieved”[5] in terms of the 1984 Act; and
3. Mr Walton would not have had standing even if the test were the same as would apply to a judicial review at common law.

Whilst reserving its opinion on the correctness of Inner House’s approach, the Supreme Court noted that, in terms of the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Ministers do not have the power to make subordinate legislation or exercise a function which is incompatible with EU law. It would therefore be necessary to consider the terms of the 1984 Act and the exercising of discretion under it in that context.

The Supreme Court also found that Mr Walton was a “person aggrieved” in terms of the 1984 Act. In coming to this conclusion, it noted his representations to the Ministers and his role in the local inquiry the fact that he lived in the vicinity of the bypass (if not the Fastlink) which would be busier as a result of the Fastlink. Also, his role in local environmental organisations and Road Sense helped to demonstrate that he was more than a “mere busybody interfering in things which did not concern him”.  As a consequence, the Supreme Court found him to have a genuine concern in what he argued was an illegality in the consent for a project which would have a significant impact on the environment.  In Lord Reed’s words he was “indubitably a person aggrieved within the meaning of the legislation”.

As regards the common law test, the Supreme Court found that the same factors which brought him within the definition of a “person aggrieved” would apply and he would have had standing to make an application for judicial review. Lord Reed also said:

 “Not every member of the public can complain of every potential breach of duty by a public body. But there may also be cases in which any individual, simply as a citizen, will have sufficient interest to bring a public authority’s violation of the law to the attention of the court, without having to demonstrate any greater impact upon himself than upon other members of the public. The rule of law would not be maintained if, because everyone was equally affected by an unlawful act, no-one was able to bring proceedings to challenge it.”

 The full text of the judgement is available here.